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Abstrac:t 
We discuss problems for convex Bayesian decision 
making and uncertainty representation. These 
include the inability to accommodate various natural 
and useful constraints and the possibility of an ana­
log of the classical Dutch Book being made against 
an agent behaving in accordance with convex Baye­
sian prescriptions. A more general set�based Bayesi� 
anism may be as tractable and would avoid the 
difficulties we raise. 
1 CONVEX BAYESIANISM 
Convex Bayesianism [Levi, 1980, 1985; Snow, 1986, 
1991; Stirling and Morrell, 1991] replaces the single, 
numerically determinate probability function 
required of an agent by strict Bayesians with a con� 
vex set of such functions. A convex Bayesian condi� 
tionalizes on evidence E by replacing a set S of pr� 
bability functions with the set 
S' = {p'\ p'(A) = p(A and E)/p(E), for some pES} 
If S is convex, so is S' [Levi, 1980]. There is no con� 
sensus among convex Bayesians regarding a decision 
method. The leading contender is Levi's 11980] E­
admiuibility criterion: an action is E-admissible if it 
maximizes expected utility relative to some probabil� 
ity function in the convex set. 
When the set contains only one function, convex 
conditionalization and E-admissibility reduce to 
their strict Bayesian counterparts. In the usual case 
(qualitative probability judgments, marginals, or 
bounds on certain probabilities are available), the 
set is a polytope. For polytopes, there are linear 
programming methods for conditionalizing ]Snow, 
1991] and for determining E-admissibility !Pittarelli, 
1991]. 
Thus, with respect to decision making and 
representing and updating uncertainty, convex Bay· 
esianism includes strict Bayesianism as a special 
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case. Further, Kyburg [1987] has demonstrated that 
any belief function over a frame of discernment W 
corresponds to a convex set S of classical probability 
functions over W, where 
Bel(X) = min p (X), 
pES 
but not conversely. There exist constraints deter� 
mining convex sets S for which a belief function can� 
not be found satisfying this correspondence. The set 
of probability functions over W = { w1, ••• , w4} sat• 
fying 0.15 :$ p(wj) :$ 0.40 is one such set [Weichsel� 
berger and Pohlman, 1990]. (A more realistic, but 
more elaborate, example is discussed in [Kyburg, 
1987].) Thus, all of the representational power of 
the belief function formalism, and more, is possessed 
by convex Bayesianism. As if these were not good 
enough reasons to convert to convex Bayesianism, 
even Savage regarded a convex set of probability 
functions as a "tempting representation of the 
unsure .. [1972, p. 58]. 
So what's wrong with convex Bayesianism? 
2 PROBLEMS 
There are natural constraints on probability judg� 
ments that cannot be represented by convex sets of 
classical probability functions. Working with the 
convex hull of a nonconvex set of probability func� 
tions may result in unnecessary indecisiveness. The 
E-admissibility criterion is justified by the convex 
Bayesian's attitude that any of the probability func­
tions in his set is permissible for use in decision mak� 
ing; but an analog of the classical Dutch Book can 
be made against an agent who replaces his noncon­
vex set of probability functions with a member of its 
convex hull. Finally, convex pooling methods have 
some undesirable properties. 
%.1.1 Disjunctive Constraints 
Suppose that one is informed that a die has been 
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manufactured in such a way that either the outcome 
'1' is favored at the expense of '2' by 1/12 or con­
versely and is otherwise fair. The possible biases 
(either of which may be adopted as probabilities for 
the toss outcomes) ace 
{( 1� ' :2·+· ... ' !),( :2' 1� ' !· ... . fJ}. (*) 
This is not a convex set. Neither is the physically 
more realistic 
{( 1 3 1 1 1 1 } 12+£,12-£·6· · · · • 5l I t:EI-48·481 u 
{( 3 1 1 1 1 1 } 12+E,12-E·6· ... '6) I EE[-48·481 • 
It may be argued that these numbers represent pos­
sible frequencies which in turn justify a range of per­
missible probabilities, with probabilities construed as 
betting rate.!; i.e., the frequencies (*) make accept­
able any odds in the range 1:11 to 3:9 for a bet on 
'1'. However, while any number in this range 
represents reasonable odds for a single bet, we know 
that in the long run only one extreme or the other 
will represent a break-even set of odds for a 
sequence of bets. In the long run any odds other 
than one of the extremes is doomed to lead to loss. 
Note that because the biases (*) ace not represent­
able by a convex set of probability functions with 
sample space equal to the set of six possible die toss 
outcomes, it follows [Kyburg, 1987] that they are not 
representable by a single Dempster-Sha.fer belief 
function with this set as its frame of discernment. 
The closest it seems possible to come is to assign 
probability masses 
1 1 
m({1}) = m({2}) = 12• m({1,2}) = 6• 
1 
m({3}) = · · · = m({6}) =-a· 
But there seems to be no way to specify that the 
mass of ! on {1,2} must either all go to {1} or all 
go to {2}. 
2.1.2 Independence 
Judgments of irrelevance (conditional irrelevance), 
that is, probabilistic independence (conditional 
independence}, are often made, are natural to make, 
can be made reliably, and provide well-known com­
putational advantages [Pearl, 1988]. But the con­
straint of independence, combined with information 
that itself would determine a convex set of probabil­
ity functions, will yield a nonconvex set. 
The simplest imaginable example is given by Jeffrey 
[1987], who points out that the set of probability 
functions expressing the irrelevance to each other of 
a given pair of propositions, and nothing more, is 
not convex. 
More generally, conditional probabilistic indepen­
dence is incompatible with a convex set representa­
tion. Suppose that interval-valued probability distri­
butions have been determined for the propositional 
variables X, Y and Z as 
X y ixy y z 'Yz 
z 11 [0,0.2] 11 z [0,0.2] -
[0.1,0.3] [0.1,0.3] z 11 11 z -
[0.2,0.4] [0.2,0.4] z y 11 z 
z 11 [0.3,0.5] 11 z [0.3,0.5] 
The set Pxy of classical, real-valued distributions 
over variables X and Y compatible with the interval 
distribution ixy is the set of distributions PxY such 
that Pxy(.) is a value in the interval ixy(.), and 
similarly for Pyz. Either set is convex, the set of 
solutions to a system of linear inequalities. The set 
Pxyz of all classical distributions on {X, Y, Z} 
whose marginals on {X, Y} and { Y, Z} ace elements 
of Pxy and Pyz, respectively, is also a convex set. 
But the subset Olxyz of classical distributions that 
in addition satisfy the constraint that variables X 
and Z ace conditionally independent, given Y, is not 
convex. The distributions Pxyz and p'xyz below ace 
elements of Olxyz, but the distribution 
1 + 1 ' qxyz=2PXYZ 2P XYZ 
is not. It fails to satisfy the conditional independence 
constraints: 
qxyz( zyz) = 0.00 * 0.0625 = qXY( zY) X qyz(yz) / qy(Y). 
X y z Pxyz P'xyz qxyz 
z y z 0.1 0.05 0.075 -
0.1 0.05 0.075 z y z 
z 'J z 0.03 0.1 0.06 - -
z 'J z 0.06 0.1 0.083 
z 'J z 0.1 0.15 0.125 -
z 'J z 0.1 0.15 0.125 - -- -
z y z 0.16 0.2 0.183 - -z 'J z 0.33 0.2 0.26 
Therefore, Olxyz is not convex. 
z.z BETTING ON INDEPENDENT EVENTS 
Suppose an agent knows that a coin is biased toward 
tails, but he thinks that it and its tossing mechan­
ism yield a set of outcomes with a binomial distribu­
tion. In particular, suppose he thinks that the proba­
bility of heads on a single toss is in the interval 
[0.1, 0.5]. 
It is a deductive consequence of these assumptions 
that the agent's beliefs regarding the four possible 
outcomes of a pair of tosses are bounded by the 
pairs of numbers: 
HH HT TH 
low 0.01 
high 0.25 
0.09 0.09 
0.25 0.25 
TT 
0.25 
0.81 
Two real-valued distributions satisfying the indepen­
dence and upper and lower probability constraints 
are: 
Toss1 Toss 2 P1 1'2 
H H 0.01 0.25 
H T 0.09 0.25 
T H 0.09 0.25 
T T 0.81 0.25 
According to convex Bayesian doctrine, any mixture 
(convex combination) of distributions belonging to 
the representation of beliefs also belongs; so the 
agent should include in his set the mixture 
1 1 
q = -pl + -1'2: 2 2 
Toss1 Toss2 
H H 
H T 
T H 
T T 
q 
0.13 
0.17 
0.17 
0.53 
Observe that this set of betting odds on the outcome 
of a pair of tosses is perfectly coherent; this is what 
we expect: the mixture of a pair of coherent betting 
functions is coherent. 
But now, as in the wiley-antagonist model of the 
Dutch Book Theorem [Ramsey, 1931; deFinetti, 
1974], let the agent post odds in accordance with 
this coherent distribution of beliefs. The wiley ant&­
gonist (a) sells our agent a ticket for $13.00 that 
returns $100.00 if HH, and nothing otherwise. That's 
fair. Likewise, it is fair for our antagonist (b) to buy 
from our agent for $25.50 a ticket that returns 
$150.00 if HT and nothing otherwise. Any collection 
of such bets on pairs of tosses would be considered 
fair. 
Let us say that an agent is booked in expectation if, 
whatever the true state of the world consistent with 
his beliefs, his long run expectation is negative. The 
expectation of this set of bets is negative almost 
everywhere, whatever the state of the world con­
sistent with the agent's beliefs. In the long run, our 
agent is almost sure to lose. 
This may be seen as follows: We compute the expec­
tation of the pair of bets (a) and (b) , from the wiley 
fox's point of view, as a function of the probability, 
Some Problems for Convex Bayesians 151 
p, of heads. The payoffs for each outcome are 
(a) 
(b) 
net 
HH 
-$87.00 
-$25.50 
-$112.50 
HT 
$13.00 
$124.50 
$137.50 
TH 
$13.00 
-$25.50 
-$12.50 
TT 
$13.00 
-$25.50 
-$12.50 
The expected payoff to the wiley fox is then 
-$250.00p2 + $150.00p - $12.50. 
This function is concave; it is positive for all values 
of p E [0.1, 0.5] except the endpoints, at both of 
which it equals $0.00, reaching a maximum of $10.00 
for p = 0.3. The fox's expectation is positive almost 
everywhere, relative to what both the agent and the 
fox know. But the agent's odds are perfectly 
coherent. 
Although the distribution q is a convex combination 
of distributions satisfying the upper and lower pro­
bability constraints and the independence con­
straint, it fails to satisfy the latter. Had the agent 
posted odds in accordance with a distribution q' 
exhibiting independence, the antagonist's long-run 
expectation (and his own), relative to q', would have 
been zero. 
To see this, let a and f3 denote the return value of 
the tickets sold by the antagonist and by the agent, 
respectively. Let w = q'( HH), z = q'( HT), 
y = q'( TH), and z = q'( TT). The table of payoffs 
to the antagonist is 
(a) 
(b) 
net 
HH HT 
-a+ aw aw 
-{Jz {J - {Jz 
-a + aw - {Jz {J + aw - {Jz 
TH TT 
aiD aiD 
-{Jz -{Jz 
aw - {Jz aw - {Jz 
The antagonist's expectation relative to q' is then 
w(-a + aw - f3z) + z(/3 + aw - f3z) + 
y (aw - f3z) + z(aw - Pz), 
which equals 0 if 
z = v'w x(1-Vw) = Vw-w, 
y = Vw-w, 
z = (1-Vw)\ 
i.e., if q' embodies the independence constraint. 
Z.l CONVEX POOLING .AND DECISIONS 
WITH CONVEX HULLS 
The traditional solution to the problem of pooling a 
set of classical probability functions is to replace 
them with a member of their convex hull, the set of 
all possible convex combinations of them. One may 
work instead with the entire convex hull. This is 
the approach of Levi [1980], who regards any of the 
elements of the convex hull to be a permissible reso­
lution of the conflict among the functions and hence 
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permissible for use in decision making. 
It can affect the outcome of a decision problem if, 
instead of a nonconvex set S, its convex hull, 
c:on�(S), is regarded as the set of permissible probo­
bility functions. Let D(a) denote the (convex) set 
of probability functions relative to which action a 
maximizes expected utility. (For distinct a and b, 
D (a} and D (b) may share boundary points, but not 
interior points.) Then a is E-admissible relative to a 
set of functions S iff D(a) n S * 0. Thus, if an 
action is E-adrnissible relative to a set S of probabil­
ity functions, then it is E-admissible relative to its 
convex hull (since S�cont�(S)), but not conversely. 
Consider the set of probability functions 
S= {p1, P2}, where 
and 
1 3 1 
PJ(c.)==s• P1(�)=4· P•(c3)=8 
3 1 1 
P2(ct}==4• P2(�)=8• P2(c3)=8• 
and the decision matrix 
CI � C3 
a1 3 3 4 
42 2.5 3.5 5 
as 1 5 4 
Relative to set S, only actions a1 and � are 
(E-)admissible; 42 is not: 
eu ( az, pJ) == 3.5625 < 4.375 = eu ( �. pi) 
eu(az, P2) = 2.9375 < 3.125 = eu(a1, P2)· 
Relative to con�(S), a.ll three are admissible. (For 
example, az maximises expected utility for the pr� 
bability function 
� 
p1 + � P2·) 
Because any set D {a) is convex, if there is consensus 
on an (meu-) admissible action on the part of 
members of a group who agree on utilities but 
disagree on probabilities, then that same action is 
admissible for any function within the convex hull of 
their individual probability functions. When there is 
not consensus, it is not obvious that a sufficient con­
dition for admissibility of a group action is that it 
ma.xi.mise expected utility relative to some convex 
combination of the group probabilities. But if any 
such function is permissible, then any action maxim­
izing expected utility relative to one of these func­
tions should be admissible. But this clashes, for 
example, with the intuitions behind Savage's [1972] 
group minimax criterion. The group minimax rule 
prescribes selection of an action ·such that the larg­
est IoN faced by any member of the group will be as 
sma.ll as poesible [p. 174]•, where the 1088 associated 
with an action by a member of the group is the 
difference between its expectation for that member 
and the expectation of the action with maximum 
expectation for that member. 
There exist decision problems for which the action 
maximizing expectation for a convex combination of 
group probabilities is not a group minimax solution, 
although the action ma.ximiJSing expectation for a 
probability distribution outside the convex hull of 
the group probabilities is a group minimax aolution. 
Consider a group containing three members facing a 
decision among three actions who recognize three 
relevant states of nature and agree on the utility 
matrix above. Suppose that the group does not wish 
to consider mixed actions and that the group opin­
ions are: 
c1 � c3 
P1 1/8 3/4 1/8 
P2 1/4 1/2 1/4 
p3 3/8 3/8 1/4 
Then action � is optimal (max:imizes expectation) 
for members 1 and 2, and action az is optimal for 
member 3. For the mixture of distributions 
1 1 3 P = gPl + 8P2 + 4Ps, 
action az is optimal. But � is the group minimax 
solution. It is optimal for infinitely many distribu­
tions outside conv({p11P21Ps} ), for example, 
p'(ct)= ! 1 p'(�)= � 1 p'(cs)=! · 
Note that the group minimax criterion is stronger 
than Pareto-optimality. In the example above, 
action az, which is not a group minimax action, is 
Pareto-optimal since p3 is an interior point of D(az). 
But any group minimax action is Pareto-optimal. 
(Suppose it were not. Then there would exist an 
action for which the expectation for some agent is 
strictly higher and for all agents is no lower, i.e., for 
which the •largest loss faced by any member• is 
strictly less.) Pareto-optimality can also be violated 
by choosing a group action maximizing expectation 
relative to an arbitrary member of conv(S) (but less 
easily). Let S again consist of three distributions, p1, 
P21 and p3• Suppose {p1, 1'2} � D(a;) n D(a;) and 
p3 E D(a;)-D(aj)· Then aj maximizes expectation 
relative to the mixture � p1 + � P2 + Op3, but is 
not Pareto-optimal. 
Suppose that the (classical) probability assessments 
of n experts are to be combined to form a single pro­
bability function and that each expert assesses his 
probabilities in a manner consistent with the belief 
in the probabilistic independence of certain of the 
events under consideration. A convex combination 
of the n functions will not necessarily exhibit the 
independence relations agreed on by the experts. H 
these relations are merely numerical artifacts, then 
the failure to preserve them is not a failure of the 
pooling method. On the other hand, there will be 
situations in which the experts each do intend for 
certain independence relations to hold (and may 
actually use them as a guide in the construction of 
their full probability function over the algebra of 
events) . 
Convex pooling of probability functions exhibits 
what may be called the marginalization effect. With 
a fixed set of pooling weights, the result of pooling a 
set of probability functions and then marginalizing is 
the same as the result of first marginalizing the func­
tions individually and then pooling. While some 
regard this as a point in favor of convex pooling 
schemes [McConway, 1981], we do not. 
Ezample. Mr. X is unsure whether the legal 
residence of former U. S. president Richard M. 
Nixon is New Jersey or California. He calls two polit­
ical science professors, P and Q, neither of whom he 
knows personally. He asks them both to assess the 
probabilities of the following: Richard Nixon is an 
extraterrestrial and lives in New Jersey, he is an 
extraterrestrial and lives in California, he is not an 
extraterrestrial and lives in New Jersey, and he is 
not an extraterrestrial and lives in California. He 
includes the extraterrestrial question because he has 
the impression that many professors are eccentric; if 
either professor gives positive probability to Nixon's 
being an extraterrestrial he will not take seriously 
the probability given by that professor to the propo­
sitions in which he is actually interested. Suppose 
the assessments he receives are: 
PRE Extraterrestrial 
Yes No PR 
NJ 0 0.85 0.85 
Residence 
CA 0 0.15 0.15 
and 
qRE Extraterrestrial 
Yes No qR 
NJ 0.9 0 0.9 
Residence 
CA 0.1 0 0.1 
Given PRE and qRE and a linear pooling scheme, the 
choice of weights should be 1 and 0. (Whatever else 
Richard Nixon may be, be is certainly not an extra-
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terrestrial.) But it would make sense for them to be 
something like 1/2 and 1/2 given only PR and qR· 
However, even for weights of 1 and 0, the marginal 
distribution that Mr. X takes as representing the 
weighted pooled opinions of the two, PR, remains 
disturbingly close to 9R on any reasonable measure 
of the closeness of probability distributions. (On the 
other band, people who believe there are extraterres­
trials on Earth may be reliable trackers of celebrities 
they think are extraterrestrials.) 
More information is available to the pooler in the 
original probability functions than is available in the 
marginals. [Lindley, 1985]. (The marginals are 
deducible from the original functions, but usually 
not conversely.) Whether as in the example the 
information bears on the reliability of the experts or 
not, there are bound to be situations in which the 
extra information is wasted if one adopts a pooling 
method exhibiting the marginalization effect. 
3 CONCLUSION 
Strict Bayesianism is too strict. It is unreasonable to 
demand that an agent adopt a single real-valued 
probability function in any and all decision-making 
contexts. Probabilities should be based on statistical 
knowledge, i.e., knowledge of frequencies; the data 
usually warrant only a more-or-less narrow interval 
of probability for each event under consideration. 
Even if one somehow has real-valued probabilities 
for certain events, they may not be those directly 
relevant for a particular decision problem. For exam­
ple, one may have strict Bayesian marginal or condi­
tional probabilities, from which one may infer a con­
vex set of strict Bayesian probability functions, from 
which in turn bounds on the probabilities of interest 
may be inferred. 
Convex Bayesianism, on the other hand, is not strict 
enough. By allowing any convex combination of 
strict Bayesian probability functions compatible 
with the available information into the set of permis­
sible functions, incompatible probability functions 
may be introduced. This is most serious in the case 
of probabilistic independence. Independence assump­
tions may often reliably be based on fundamental 
knowledge about causality and are necessary for 
efficient management of uncertainty in domains of 
realistic size. But the convex bull of a set of func­
tions that satisfy an independence constraint will 
contain functions that do not. 
Replacing a not-necessarily convex set of classical 
probability functions with its convex hull may result 
in unnecessary indecisiveness; an action may be E-
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admissible with respect to the convex hull of a set S 
but not relative to S itself. It may also lead to 
financial ruin. Posting odds in accordance with a 
probability function not in S but in the convex hull 
of S will result in negative long-run expectation rela.­
tive to the knowledge embodied in S. 
A more general &et-btued Bayui4n.um is discussed 
elsewhere [Kyburg and Pittarelli, 1992] . A set-based 
Bayesian will represent uncertainty by a set of clas­
sical probability functions, as will the convex Baye­
sian. However, given the same data, hers will be a 
subset of the convex Bayesian's representation. 
(Hence, her representation will be more informative, 
by any reasonable measure of the information con­
tent of sets of probability functions.) 
Determining whether or not an action is E­
admissible relative to a convex or nonconvex set S 
for which a system of constraints can be formulated 
(we have discussed examples only of linear con­
straints, for the convex case) requires determining 
whether or not a mathematical programming prob­
lem has a feasible solution; it is not necessary to 
identify an optimal solution. Thus, it is not clear 
that the computational costs associated with a more 
flexible set-based Bayesianism are so much greater 
that one should have to settle for a strictly convex 
alternative to strict Bayesianism. 
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